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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Eric Gunter contends the district court improperly allowed the State to present irrelevant
evidence and it improperly denied his motion for a mistrial when evidence was elicited in
violation of a ruling in limine.

The State’s responses are problematic because they either

misunderstand the facts of the case or misunderstand the applicable legal standard. As such,
those arguments should be rejected and this Court should vacate Mr. Gunter’s conviction and
remand this case for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Gunter’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by not excluding the evidence of the random person
punching Mr. Gunter as irrelevant.

II.

Whether the district court erred by not ordering a mistrial based on the improper
reference to what the random person said at trial.

III.

Whether the accumulation of errors in this case requires reversal even if this Court
determines them all to be individually harmless.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Not Excluding The Evidence Of The Random Person Punching
Mr. Gunter As Irrelevant

A.

This Court Should Disregard The State’s Arguments About The Relevance Of The Punch
Itself Because The Prosecutor Conceded That Point Below
The State spends a significant amount of time in its Response arguing about how the fact

that the random person punched Mr. Gunter was, in and of itself, relevant.

(See Resp.

Br., pp.10-15.) This Court should refuse to consider those arguments because the prosecutor
conceded that point below. Specifically, the prosecutor’s position below was:
THE COURT: So he’s outside. That’s not a problem in terms of his comments
about that. That he got punched is really only probative if we know why he got
punched, isn’t it?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Correct, Your Honor, it is.
(Tr., p.145, Ls.16-20 (emphasis added).) The State attempts to recast that answer as only
arguing that the random person’s statement while he punched Mr. Gunter was relevant
(Resp. Br., p.13), but the express context of the question which the prosecutor was answering
reveals the State’s position to be meritless. Since the prosecutor expressly conceded that the
punch was only relevant if the random person’s comments about why he was punching
Mr. Gunter were also admissible, all the State’s arguments on appeal about why the punch, in
absence of evidence about the statement, was relevant are improper and should be rejected.
State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (holding it is improper for the State to take a
position on appeal that is contrary to a position it conceded below).
Even if the State’s arguments about the relevance of the punch itself were properly made
in this appeal, they are still actually based on the jury knowing or inferring the random person’s
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reason for punching Mr. Gunter. (See generally Resp. Br., pp.10-15.) As such, all the State’s
arguments in that regard actually reinforce Mr. Gunter’s position – that the mere fact that
Mr. Gunter got punched was not, in and of itself, relevant. Since the district court concluded the
random person’s explanation for why he punched Mr. Gunter was not admissible, it was
improper for the district court to allow the State to present evidence of the concededly-irrelevant
fact that Mr. Gunter was punched.

See also State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 144 (2014)

(explaining it is improper for the prosecutor to infer the contents of an excluded statement to the
jury).

B.

The State Has Failed To Prove The Error In Admitting The Irrelevant Evidence About
The Random Person Punching Mr. Gunter Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State failed to carry its burden to show the improper introduction of the punch itself

without any explanation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 166
Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1138 (2020). Essentially, the State’s argument in this regard is
that the introduction of this irrelevant evidence must be harmless because, since irrelevant
evidence, by definition, has no probative value, it cannot have any prejudicial impact either.
(Resp. Br., p.14 (“Even if lacking in probative value, the evidence lacks prejudicial force.”).)
That argument is improper under this Court’s recent decision in Garcia.
As the Garcia Court made clear, the harmless error test is a two-pronged analysis which
“requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the erroneous
evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error.” Id. As
such, it is not sufficient to simply say the other evidence presented would have been sufficient to
support a finding of guilt; the harmless error standard requires the State to prove there is no
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reasonable possibility the error itself did not have an impact on the jury’s resolution of the case.
Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138-39.
The State’s argument for harmlessness is improper because it confuses the concept of
probative value to the charges under I.R.E. 401 with the concept of probative impact on the
jury’s decision under Garcia. The problem is that jurors can use irrelevant evidence to support a
decision to convict, and in such cases, the error has had a probative impact on the decision even
though the erroneously-introduced evidence was not probative to the charges under I.R.E. 401.
Cf. State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 34 (Ct. App. 1988) (explaining the appellate court’s focus when
there is a motion for mistrial based on the improper introduction of evidence is on the improper
evidence’s “continuing impact on the trial”), overruled on other grounds. As the Seventh Circuit
succinctly explained in rejecting such an argument, explaining: “The admission of this irrelevant
evidence had the effect of improperly bolstering the credibility of the government’s case in the
eyes of the jury, and the error was not harmless.” United States v. Cunningham, 462 F.3d 708,
710 (7th Cir. 2006).
This Court should likewise reject the State’s harmless error argument, which would
effectively render the erroneous introduction of irrelevant evidence incapable of being remedied
on appeal. As in Cunningham, there is a reasonable possibility that the fact that the random
person punched Mr. Gunter had a probative impact on the jurors’ deliberations because it could
still have been improperly used by the jurors to conclude that Ms. Rey was more credible than
Mr. Gunter in her testimony about the events in question. 1 (See Resp. Br., p.12.) That is

1

The State takes issue with Mr. Gunter’s description of the random person’s punch as occurring
“after” the alleged battery of Ms. Rey. (See Resp. Br., pp.12-13 & n.3 (noting that, in Ms. Rey’s
hearing testimony, she said the punch occurred while the neighbor was “pulling her over” across
the street”).) Regardless of whether it was a few seconds after or a few minutes after the
domestic confrontation ended, the random person’s punch was still “after” the domestic
5

problematic in this case because the jurors obviously concluded Ms. Rey was not wholly
credible, since they acquitted Mr. Gunter on another charge which was also based primarily on
her testimony.

As such, there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneously-introduced

irrelevant evidence of the fact that a random person punched Mr. Gunter had an impact – that the
jurors gave it weight in their deliberations – alongside all the other evidence presented.
Therefore, the State has failed to prove that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

II.
The District Court Erred By Not Ordering A Mistrial Based On The Improper Reference To
What The Random Person Said At Trial

A.

The State’s Arguments On The Merits Of The Admissibility Of The Random Person’s
Statements Misunderstand The Relevant Case Law
The majority of the State’s arguments on the merits of the admissibility of the random

person’s statement are unremarkable and require no further response here. As such, Mr. Gunter
simply refers this Court back to pages 11-16 of his Appellant’s Brief. However, the State’s
argument on the merits under the Confrontation Clause requires a response because it ignores the
test established by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether a statement is
testimonial.
First, the State’s arguments run directly contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 360 (2011). In Bryant, the Supreme Court
confrontation ended. Besides, the fact that it occurred close in time to the alleged criminal
conduct does not automatically make that fact admissible. State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 573
(2017). Rather, such evidence must still be admissible in its own right under the Rules of
Evidence. Id. Since the bare fact that Mr. Gunter got punched by someone else did not make
any of the material facts of this case more or less likely without the explanation as to why the
punch was being thrown, the bare fact that Mr. Gunter got punched after the alleged domestic
incident was not relevant under I.R.E. 401 regardless of however long after that alleged incident
the punch was.
6

explained the relevant inquiry when determining whether a statement is testimonial “is not the
subjective or actual purpose of the individuals involved in a particular encounter, but rather the
purpose that reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals’
statements and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.”

Id.

Nevertheless, the State asserts that, because the random person did not hang around to talk with
police – because he did not subjectively intend the statements to be available at a future trial –
his statement about why he was punching Mr. Gunter was not testimonial. (Resp. Br., p.20.)
This Court should reject that argument, since it is directly contrary to Bryant.
Moreover, the State’s arguments are contrary to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006). In Davis the Supreme Court was
clear that “[t]he Confrontation Clause in no way governs police conduct, because it is the trial
use of, not the investigatory collection of, ex parte testimonial statements which offends that
provision.

But neither can police conduct govern the Confrontation Clause; testimonial

statements are what they are.” Id. (emphasis from original). Thus, the fact that the random
person’s statement was not solicited by questioning has no impact on whether his assertion
statement was testimonial and barred by the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 822 n.1 (explaining
the only reason it talked about the statements in that case in terms of interrogation was that they
had, in that particular case, been elicited by sustained questioning, but making it clear that was
by no means determinative). And yet, the State contends that, because the random person’s
statement was not solicited by police officers (or by any of the other witnesses present), the
random person’s statement was not testimonial. (Resp. Br., p.20.) Again, this Court should
reject the State’s argument as directly contrary to clear United States Supreme Court precedent.
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Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court made clear: “Whether a statement is testimonial is
determined by looking at the statement’s primary purpose and its similarities to traditional
testimony.” State v. Stanfield, 158 Idaho 327, 332 (2015) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). “[A]
statement is testimonial when ‘the circumstances objectively indicate that . . . the primary
purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.’”

Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822) (ellipses from Stanfield).

Here, the

circumstances objectively indicate that the random person’s statement was to establish a past
event – the alleged domestic battery – as a justification for him punching Mr. Gunter. An
objective person would understand that as being relevant to not only the potential case against
Mr. Gunter as a direct accusation of Mr. Gunter, but also, potentially, to a battery case against
the random persons. As such, it was a testimonial statement under the test set forth by the United
States Supreme Court.
Therefore, there never should have been a “close” question as to whether the random
person’s statement was admissible in Mr. Gunter’s trial, where the random person was not
identified, much less subjected to cross-examination. (See Tr., p.205, Ls.12-17.) Its presentation
was, as discussed in detail in the Appellant’s Brief, in error and prejudicial to Mr. Gunter despite
the district court’s instruction to the jury. As a result, the district court erred by denying his
motion for a mistrial based on that error.

III.
The Accumulation Of Errors In This Case Requires Reversal Even If This Court Determines
Them All To Be Individually Harmless
The State’s only argument with respect to the cumulative error doctrine was that there
were no errors to accumulate. (See Resp. Br., p.24.) As such, it has waived any argument that
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the combined effect of the errors is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Almaraz,
154 Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013); State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).
As demonstrated in Sections I and II, supra, there were, in fact, two errors in this case –
the improper admission of the fact Mr. Gunter got punched and the random person’s statement
about the reason he was doing that. The cumulative probative impact of these two errors is
particularly problematic in this case, since the combined effect is to create evidence weighing
heavily on the credibility determination between Ms. Rey’s and Mr. Gunter’s versions of events
which lies at the heart of this case. Compare State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 13 (2013) (finding the
error in excluding evidence which spoke to the complaining witness’s credibility was not
harmless). As such, even if the other evidence might have, by itself, been sufficient to justify the
conviction, that is not enough to declare the cumulative impact of the errors harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. In fact, doing so would be to commit the same error that the United States
Supreme Court clearly rejected in Chapman.2 See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138-39 (making it clear
a harmless error analysis cannot rely on just the “overwhelming” nature of the other evidence
presented); see also State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572-73 (2007) (explaining that the cumulative
error analysis uses the same basic analysis as harmless error does).
In fact, as discussed in detail in the Appellant’s Brief at page 17, it was precisely the sort
of evidence several jurors said they would be looking for in resolving such questions. The fact
that those potential jurors, including the one who actually deliberated on this case, also declared
they could follow the judge’s instructions does not automatically make the error (see Resp.
Br., p.23), or the combined effect of the errors, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.,
Pacheco v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 116 Idaho 794, 803 (1989) (recognizing that, when jurors

2

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
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hear improper information, even if a corrected version of that information is subsequently
presented, “the jurors can hardly be expected to unring the bell” and not consider the improper
version of the information).
Since this combination of evidence went directly to the central question in this case, the
cumulative probative effect of those errors was significant, and therefore, not harmless. As such,
this Court should vacate the judgment as a result of the cumulative impact of those errors.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gunter respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 11th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BRD/eas

11

